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Abstract 
Although very little research in bargaining has addressed how perpetrators should deal 
with the aftermath of unfair allocations, it has been proposed that an apology may help 
the reconciliation process. Prior research, however, only focused on whether apologies 
can reveal positive effects on the reconciliation process but did not focus yet on whether 
perpetrators are actually willing to apologize. In this paper we investigate perpetrator’s 
willingness to apologize for a trust violation in a bargaining setting. We hypothesized that 
perpetrators willingness to apologize would be a function of the extent to which the 
victim of the trust violation is willing to forgive. This effect, however, was expected to 
emerge only among those perpetrators who are low in dispositional trust.  The results 
from a laboratory study with actual transgressions and actual apologetic behavior 
supported our predictions and thus emphasize an instrumental view on apologizing in 
bargaining situations.   
Keywords: Apologies; Perpetrators; Bargaining; Instrumental Perspective; Trust Game; 
Forgiveness. 
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An Instrumental Perspective on Apologizing in Bargaining: The importance of 
forgiveness to apologize 
Bargaining is a breeding ground for unfair allocations. Due to the highly interdependent 
nature of bargaining situations, there is a conflict between self-interest and the bargaining 
partner’s interest (Komorita & Parks, 1996). One important guide that people use to 
balance the conflicting interests in these types of bargaining situations is the equality 
norm. This norm beholds that all bargaining parties receive an equal share of the 
commodity that is to be divided (Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). This fairness rule 
implies that people do not only care about their own outcomes in bargaining, but also 
value the outcomes of others (Blount, 1995; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 
1989). Breaking the equality norm is not only considered to be unfair and undesirable 
when one receives less than the other party; receiving more is generally considered to be 
undesirable too (Blount, 1995; Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Loewenstein et al., 1989). 
People use the equality norm as a guide in bargaining settings. A guide, not only 
for their own behavior, but also to base their expectations on of what others will do. In 
other words, people expect their bargaining partner to adhere to the equality norm as well 
(Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). For this reason, violating the equality norm does not only 
lead to perceptions of unfairness but also to a decrease in trust (Desmet, De Cremer, & 
Van Dijk, 2011). Trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395).  Based on this definition, it 
follows that trust can be violated after deviation from the equality norm because this 
deviation violates the positive expectations of the victim that the other party will act in 
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line with the equality rule. Research indeed suggest that people are aversive towards such 
an equality violation as people have been shown to make costly choices in order not to 
violate fairness norms (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006). 
After a trust violation, perpetrators can feel motivated to reconcile with the 
victim. Reconciliation can be valuable to the perpetrator because successful reconciliation 
leads to a continuation of a cooperative relationship with the victim. Despite the 
importance of this reconciliation process, research on bargaining has devoted almost no 
attention to examining the aftermath of unfair offers (De Cremer, 2010). Rather, most 
studies have examined how trust develops or how it plays a role in maintaining 
cooperation. As such, hardly any studies – at least to our knowledge - have looked at how 
violated trust can be repaired. In fact ever since Elangovan and Shapiro (1998, p. 548) 
noted at the end of the nineties that, “research on the violation of trust has significantly 
lagged behind interest in the phenomenon of trust”, more recent articles have articulated 
that despite the need to focus on this topic “surprisingly few studies have directly 
examined how trust may be repaired” (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006, p. 50). 
Because trust is considered to be one of the most essential lubricants of our social and 
economic exchanges (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Kramer, 1999), it is 
important for research to address the kind of actions that are required for reconciliation 
efforts to succeed. 
One important reconciliation tool, available to the perpetrator, is an apology. 
Apologies address the experienced injustice of the victim (Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & 
Murnighan, 2002; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 
1989). An apology is a combined statement of both and admission of wrongdoing and 
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regret for the violation (Lazare, 2004; Kim, et al., 2009). Apologies directly address the 
violated positive expectations (i.e. trust) of the victim by implicitly promising that the 
transgression will not be repeated and thus suggesting that the perpetrator is worthy of 
being trusted again (Kim et al., 2009). 
Research outside the bargaining literature has revealed evidence that relationships 
can be reconciled more effectively if an apology is given and thereby responsibility for 
the trust violation is acknowledged (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Kim et al., 2004; 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). To date, only a few 
published studies have addressed whether the specific use of apologies has an effect 
within more economically-based exchanges such as social dilemmas and ultimatum 
bargaining games (see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002; De Cremer, 2010; 
De Cremer, van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010; for an interesting field study, see Cohen, 1999). 
These studies did indeed reveal that apologizing for unfair allocations led to increased 
cooperation and higher future trust behavior.  
What all these studies have in common is that they adopted the perspective of the 
victim. That is, these studies examined whether and when apologies delivered by the 
perpetrator have a positive effect on the party suffering from the trust violation. This 
approach is a first good step towards identifying the important value of apologies in the 
reconciliation process (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011). The most 
important step, however, is to examine whether or not perpetrators are willing to 
apologize, and when they are most likely to do so. This perpetrator perspective is 
virtually lacking in the literature and particularly so in the bargaining literature. 
Consequently, we know very little about whether perpetrators are actually willing to 
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make use of an apology when resources are allocated in unfair ways. Because 
reconciliation of relationships is a bi-directional issue, only knowing whether victims 
desire an apology is of limited value. Therefore, we need to promote our insights into the 
motives that make perpetrators apologize.  
In the present paper, we adopt the perspective of the perpetrator. We study under 
which conditions perpetrators choose to apologize to the victim. We examine apologizing 
as a behavior in the context of a modified trust game in which the second party (the one 
receiving the tripled money send by party 1) violates the fairness norm of equality and 
thus hampers the trust of the first party. In predicting whether perpetrators would 
apologize or not, we adopt an instrumental perspective, meaning that the choice to 
apologize by the perpetrator will be motivated by the likelihood that an apology will elicit 
its intended effect. The effect that we assume that perpetrators strive for when 
apologizing is to be forgiven by the victim. We consider this approach to be instrumental 
because the decision to apologize or not becomes conditional on the likelihood of 
whether the victim will forgive or not. 
1. Apologies: An instrumental perspective 
We propose that an important reason to apologize is to restore the relationship 
with the victim, which usually implies that the perpetrator will be forgiven. The desire for 
forgiveness has been identified as an important motive to initiate the reconciliation 
process (Schnabel & Nadler, 2008). After a transgression, a perpetrator may feel moral 
inferiority, guilt, or shame. These feelings can lead to an intrinsic motivation to be 
forgiven by the victim (Schnabel & Nadler, 2008). Indeed, the motive to be forgiven 
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becomes even more important if the perpetrator wants to continue a cooperative 
relationship with the victim (Bottom et al., 2002). 
It is important to note, however, that while achieving reconciliation may be 
desirable, perpetrators also take a substantial social risk by apologizing. By apologizing, 
perpetrators accept blame for their actions (Kim et al., 2009). Hence, perpetrators risk a 
host of aversive social consequences - like rejection, humiliation and punishment - that 
would not be the case if they had not accepted blame by apologizing (Exline et al., 2007). 
An instrumental motivation perspective therefore suggests that perpetrators will be 
careful to apologize and become strategic when it comes down to apologizing. That is, 
the decision to apologize by the perpetrator will be conditional on the likelihood that 
victims are willing to forgive that perpetrator.  
Based on this instrumental perspective, it thus stands to reason that perpetrators 
will be less willing to apologize when the victim seems unforgiving than when the victim 
seems forgiving. In this case, the decision to apologize should be driven by perceptions of 
the perpetrator that the victim is indeed willing to restore the relationship. This line of 
reasoning therefore suggests that when the victim seems forgiving, perpetrators should 
reason that an apology on their behalf will be instrumental in restoring trust in the 
relationship. When the victim does not seem forgiving, perpetrators should perceive the 
delivery of an apology to be less instrumental in achieving reconciliation. As such, 
expectations that an apology will restore the relationship with the victim should underlie 
the relationship between perceived forgiveness of the victim and apologizing behavior of 
the perpetrator.  
2. Perpetrator’s trust moderating the instrumental approach 
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Will perpetrators, however, always employ such an instrumental kind of thinking 
towards apologizing? We argue that whether perpetrators will let their decision to 
apologize be influenced by the likelihood of whether the victim is motivated to forgive or 
not, be depend on their level of dispositional trust. The extent to which people differ in 
dispositional trust is directly related to how people approach interpersonal behaviors in 
more versus less instrumental ways. We believe there is good reason to expect that 
particularly low trusters will adjust their apologetic behavior as a function of the 
perceived likelihood to be forgiven.  
One important reason for this hypothesis is that low trusters, in contrast to high 
trusters, tend to harbor less positive impressions of others, require more reassurance 
before cooperating, and are less inclined to believe that cooperation will be reciprocated 
(Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004). High trusters are open towards others and 
more willing to take initial risks. High trusters tend to harbor benign impressions of 
others, tend to display more immediate cooperation, and are more likely to believe that 
cooperation will be reciprocated (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001 ; Tazelaar et al., 
2004). As such, high trusters’ will initially be more willing to give the benefit of the 
doubt towards their interaction partner and show more socially risky behavior (Stouten, 
De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2006). Therefore, high trusters will be more willing to take the 
risks associated with apologizing while low trusters are less inclined to do this. As such, 
low trusters can be considered as more strategic in assessing whether an apology will be 
responded to favorably and will thus apologize more easily if forgiveness is likely to be 
given (De Cremer et al., 2001; Tazelaar et al., 2004).  
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To summarize, we predict that low trusters will be particularly influenced in their 
apologizing behavior by perceptions of the victims’ inclination to forgive, while high 
trusters will be less influenced by the perceived forgiving intentions of the victim 
(Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we predict that expectations that an apology will restore the 
relationship with the victim will mediate the interactive relationship between perceived 
forgiveness of the victim and perpetrators’ dispositional level of trust on apologizing 
behavior (Hypothesis 2). 
3. The Present Research 
To test our hypotheses in a controlled manner, we conducted an experimental lab 
study to investigate actual apologetic behavior. To date, the small number of studies 
examining the delivery of apologies relied primarily on recall tasks or imagined scenario 
settings (Meijer, 1998). At least to our knowledge, research has not tested actual 
apologetic behavior. The use of scenarios and free recall tasks is an important first step in 
understanding apologetic behavior of perpetrator. However, because behavioral 
intentions and actual behavior do not always correspond, it is necessary to test our 
predictions with respect to actual apologetic behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).  
Therefore, in our study, we designed a novel paradigm in which participants were 
induced to commit a transgression against another participant, upon which they were 
given the opportunity to apologize to the victim. Specifically, to make participants 
commit a transgression, we modified a standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 
1995). The trust game is a coordination game in which players can increase their earnings 
by trusting each other, at the risk of being exploited. In this game, Player 1 starts with an 
initial endowment and can decide to transfer any part of his/her endowment to Player 2. 
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Whatever Player 1 transfers to Player 2 is tripled. Subsequently, Player 2 has to decide 
how much of the tripled sum he/she wants to return to Player 1. Thus, the more Player 1 
trusts Player 2 to return a fair amount, the more likely Player 1 will be to transfer his/her 
endowments. We modified this game to induce unfair behavior by the participant, who 
was allocated to the Player 2 position. We did this by creating uncertainty about the 
original endowment of player 1; thereby licensing the participant to keep a larger share of 
the endowment that player 2 could divide (for the full experimental procedure, see the 
Procedure section).  
4. Method 
4.1 Participants and design.  
A total of 153 participants (55 women, 98 men; M(age) = 19.82, SD(age) = 1.59) were 
randomly assigned to either the forgiving or unforgiving condition.  
4.2 Procedure.  
Participants were placed in individual cubicles in front of a computer. Participants’ 
dispositional trust was measured beforehand, using the 8 item interpersonal trust scale by 
Yamagishi (1988; α = .78)1. Participants were then asked to engage in a series of tasks 
together with another person present in the lab. They would play the previously 
mentioned modified version of the trust game. The game was presented as a task on 
social decision-making, and all participants were told that they would be Player 2 in the 
study. Participants were told that they would be playing an investment game with another 
person who was in the lab: Player 1 (all the behavior by Player 1 was preprogrammed). It 
was explained that Player 1 had to decide how much of his/her endowment to transfer to 
the participant. Participants were clearly told that the amount that Player 1 would send 
FORGIVENESS PROMOTES APOLOGIZING 11 
 
 
would be tripled, and that they had to decide which amount to return to Player 1. 
Subsequently, the task started, and participants learned that Player 1 had transferred 10 
chips of significant monetary value, which were tripled to 30 chips. They then had to 
decide how many of these 30 chips to return to Player 1. 
We modified the game in such a way that participants were likely to make an 
unfair decision towards Player 1 (i.e., more likely to keep more chips for themselves than 
to give back to Player 1). We did so by raising uncertainty over Player 1’s initial 
endowment. It was explained that the initial endowment of Player 1 could be anything 
from 10 to 30 chips; however, the exact endowment was unknown to the participant. 
Because 10 chips was the lowest endowment possible, we expected that most participants 
would infer that the original endowment of Player 1 would be larger than 10 chips. To 
check this assumption, we asked participants to estimate the initial endowment of Player 
1 at this point: overall, participants thought the original endowment of Player 1 was 20.41 
chips (SD = 5.57) large. Because participants estimated the original endowment of player 
1 to by larger than 10 chips it meant that Player 1 had chosen not to transfer all his/her 
chips. From this point of view, we expected that participants would feel justified to keep 
a larger share of the 30 chips. 
 After participants had made their decision how to divide the 30 chips, we 
revealed that the initial endowment of Player 1 was in fact only 10 chips. Player 1 had 
thus transferred his/her entire endowment. Participants who had divided the 30 chips 
unequally (74%) had violated the equality rule and acted unfairly towards Player 1. 
Participants who had divided the chips equally or returned more than 15 chips (26%) had 
not committed a transgression. After this feedback concerning the final division of the 
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chips, we asked participants two questions regarding their perceptions of the fairness of 
the final division and whether participants thought they violated Player 1’s trust. For the 
group who had not committed a transgression the experiment ended at this point. The 
majority of the participants, who did commit a transgression, proceeded to the 
forgiveness manipulation. 
4.3 Forgiveness manipulation.  
Participants who committed a transgression received a message from Player 1. In the not 
forgiving condition this message was: “I have fewer chips than you! I simply do not 
accept this! I know that I am not the kind of person who forgives this kind of behavior so I 
will not forgive you this time”. In the forgiving condition, this message was: “I have 
fewer chips than you! That is too bad. But I will give you the benefit of the doubt for now. 
I will forgive you for now but please be cooperative in the future”. 
Apology behavior was assessed after this message. Participants were given the 
choice between two messages to send back to Player 1:“I want to apologize” or “I do not 
want to apologize”.  
Participants’ instrumentality perceptions were assessed using three questions (all 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much so): (1) To what extent do 
you think an apology is important for Player 1?, (2) How effective do you think an 
apology will be to restore your relationship with Player 1?, (3) To what extent do you 
think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and Player 1? These items 
were combined into an average instrumentality perceptions score (α = .85). 
We used three items to check our forgiveness manipulation (7-point scale, ranging 
from 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so): (1) Do you think that Player 1 is somebody who 
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easily forgives?, (2). Do you think Player 1 is somebody who does not easily forgive? 
(Recoded), and (3). Do you think Player 1 is forgiving? These items were combined into 
an average forgiveness score (α = .95). 
5. Results 
5.1 Perceptions of initial endowment size and endowments returned.  
To check whether participants indeed overestimated Player 1’s initial endowment, we 
asked participants how many chips they thought Player 1 had originally been endowed 
with. Overall, participants thought the original endowment of player 1 was 20.41 chips 
large (SD = 5.57). Participants who committed the transgression thought the original 
endowment was significantly larger (M = 21.63, SD = 5.00) than participants who did not 
committed the transgression (M = 16.95, SD = 5.73; t(151) = 4.89, p < .001). In line with 
these perceptions, participants who transgressed returned less chips (M = 7.88, SD = 
3.62) than participants who did not transgress (M = 16.55, SD = 3.31; t(151) = 13.31, p < 
.001). 
5.2 Perceptions of fairness and violated trust.  
We modified our trust game in such a way that our participants would commit a 
transgression. To check whether participants indeed perceived the final division as unfair 
and as violating trust they were required to respond to three questions. First we asked 
them “To what extent do you think the final division is fair?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
completely). A t-test showed that participants who committed the transgression 
considered the final division to be less fair (M = 2.73, SD = 1.40) than participants who 
did not committed a transgression (M = 6.00, SD = 1.80, t(151) = 11.749, p < .001). 
Moreover, a 95% confidence interval of the mean fairness perceptions of the participants 
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who committed a transgression showed the mean was significantly lower than the scale 
mean (95% C.I.: 2.47 – 2.99), providing further support that participants who committed 
the transgression considered the final division to be unfair. 
In order to check whether participants regarded the unfair offer as a trust violation 
we asked them: “To what extent do you think you violated Player 1’s trust?” (1 = not at 
all, 7 = completely). Again, participants who committed the transgression thought they 
violated Player 1’s trust significantly more (M = 5.41, SD = 1.22) than participants who 
did not committed a transgression (M = 2.10, SD = 1.69, t(151) = 13.27, p < .001). A 
95% C.I. showed that the mean perception of the trust violation was significantly higher 
than the scale mean (95% C.I. 5.18 – 5.64), providing evidence that the participants who 
committed the transgression indeed perceived the unfair division to be a trust violation. 
Finally, we checked the extent to which participants thought that player 1 still 
trusted them “To what extent do you think Player 1 still trusts you?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
completely). Again, participants who committed the transgression thought Player 1 
trusted them less (M = 3.08, SD = 1.50) than participants who did not commit the 
transgression (M = 6.15, SD = 1.17, t(151) = 11.77, p < .001). A 95% Confidence Interval 
of the mean trust perception of the participants who committed the transgression again 
showed that these participants thought that Player 1 was distrustful towards them (95% 
C.I.: 2.80 – 3.36).  
5.3 Forgiveness manipulation check.  
A linear regression analysis on our manipulation check scale with the forgiveness 
manipulation and trust as independent variables revealed a main effect of forgiveness (β = 
.85, t = 16.72, p < .001). No other effects reached significance. Participants indeed 
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perceived Player 1 to be more forgiving in the forgiving condition (M = 5.57, SD = .79) 
than in the unforgiving condition (M = 2.40, SD = 1.20). 
5.4 Apologetic behavior.  
Because our main dependent variable was categorical in nature (either apologize or not 
apologize) we used logistic regression to test our hypotheses. Logistic regression uses 
odds to test whether a specific response is significantly more likely than chance to be 
picked by participants. If an odd is significantly higher than 1, this means (within the 
context of this experiment) that it is significantly more likely that an apology is given 
instead of no apology. If an odd is significantly smaller than 1, it means that no apology 
is significantly more likely to be given than an apology. When an odd does not differ 
significantly from 1, it means that it is equally likely that either an apology or no apology 
is given (i.e. there is no pattern). Because proportions have more intuitive appeal than 
odds, we present, together with the odds, the proportions of apologies given in each 
condition. Although these proportions give the same information as the odds, we believe 
it helps in interpreting the results.  
For our simple effects tests, we followed procedures as outlined by Jaccard 
(2001). Simple effects are tested by means of odds ratios. An odds ratio is the ratio 
between two odds from two different cells (i.e. conditions). If the odds ratio is 
significantly larger or smaller than 1, this means that the odds from those two cells differ 
significantly from each other. 
We conducted a stepwise logistical regression with the forgiveness manipulation 
as a categorical independent variable and trust as a continuous independent variable. The 
analysis with the main effects of the forgiveness manipulation and trust in step 1 
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revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of the forgiveness manipulation (B = -1.74, 
Wald = 12.79, p < .001) but no main effect of trust (B = .17, Wald = .53, p = .23). In step 
2 the main effect of forgiveness remained significant (B = -2.08, Wald = 12.34, p < .001), 
as was the main effect of trust (B = -1.43, Wald = 3.43, p = .03), but more importantly 
and in line with Hypothesis 1, the interaction between forgiveness and trust was 
significant (B = 1.19, Wald = 4.46, p = .04; see Table 1).  
We compared the forgiveness conditions between high trusters (+1 SD) and low 
trusters (-1 SD). Low trusters were more sensitive to the forgiving communication as they 
were significantly more likely to apologize when the victim seemed forgiving (proportion 
of .96) rather than unforgiving (proportion of .5; B = 3.27, Wald = 11.16, p = .001; odds 
ratio = 26.393). High trusters did not differ in their apologetic behavior when the victim 
seemed forgiving (proportion of .79) or unforgiving (proportion of .61; B = .87, Wald = 
2.06, p = .15; odds ratio = 2.425). The results further showed that when the victim did not 
seem forgiving, trust had no significant impact on apologetic behavior (B = .23, Wald = 
.59, p = .44; odds ratio = 0.627). When the victim seemed forgiving, low trusters were 
significantly more likely than high trusters to apologize (B = -.96, Wald = 4.04, p = .04; 
odds ratio = 6.826).  
5.5 Instrumentality of an apology.   
A regression analysis revealed significant main effects of the forgiveness manipulation  
(β = .40, t = 4.72 p < .001) and of trust (β = -.17, t = -1.96 p = .03 (one-sided)) on the 
perceived instrumentality of an apology. Importantly, we also found the predicted 
interaction between perceived forgiveness and trust on perceived instrumentality of the 
apology (β = .15, t = -1.77, p = .03 (one-sided)). A simple slopes analysis showed that 
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trust was a significant predictor when the victim seemed forgiving (β = -.32, t = -2.88, p = 
.005) but not significant when the victim did not seem forgiving (β = -.02, t = -.12, p = 
.90). 
5.6 Mediation analysis.  
To test our second hypothesis, we examined whether perceived instrumentality of an 
apology mediated the interactive relationship between trust and perceived forgiveness on 
apologies. Specifically, we expected that perceived instrumentality would mediate the 
effect of forgiveness information on apologies, but only for those low in trust and not for 
those high in trust. A bootstrap procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) which tested the 
simple indirect effect of perceived forgiveness on apologies through perceived 
instrumentality showed a significant indirect effect for low (-1 SD) trusters (b = .93, S.E. 
= .30, 95% C.I. -1.44  –  -.50) while no significant indirect effect was present for high (+1 
SD) trusters (b = -.41, S.E. = .27, 95% C.I. -.87 – .02). This result shows that 
instrumentality perceptions explained the decision of low trusters to apologize as a 
function of the likelihood that the victim will forgive, whereas this was not the case for 
high trusters. 
6. Discussion 
Dividing valuable resources in an unfair manner can lead to violated trust between 
the parties involved, which makes future interactions less productive and pleasant. 
Because unfair allocations easily arise, it is important to understand the mechanisms by 
which we can repair violated trust in such interdependent settings. Prior research has 
identified an apology as an effective trust repair strategy (e.g. Bottom et al. 2002; 
Ohbuchi et al., 1989). However, research to date has neglected to study whether 
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perpetrators are also willing to actually apologize and if so, when they are most likely to 
do this. Our present findings show that perpetrators use apologies in a strategic way. That 
is, they apologize significantly more when the likelihood that the victim will forgive is 
high. If the likelihood is low, perpetrators are less willing to apologize. 
 How can these findings be understood? One important reason may be that 
apologizing entails a considerable social risk. Apologies are often regarded as an 
acceptance of blame for the transgression, which can give rise to a host of aversive social 
consequences - like rejection, humiliation and punishment (Kim et al., 2009). This would 
suggest that it is important for perpetrators to deliver apologies only when they are likely 
to be met with favorable consequences. One important and favorable consequence in 
interdependent settings is whether the other party (the victim) will forgive. Forgiveness 
holds the idea that subsequent interactions will be cooperative and will not include blame 
of one’s prior unfair behavior (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). Thus, apologizing 
behavior is much more likely to occur if it pays off in terms of being forgiven. 
This relationship between anticipated forgiveness and apologetic behavior is 
further substantiated by the finding that dispositional trust influenced perpetrators’ 
sensitivity to the victim's forgivingness. Trust entails a willingness to be vulnerable to 
others, and therefore is strongly related to the extent to which people are willing to take 
social risks (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Indeed, we find that low trusters (who do 
not generally tend to believe people will reciprocate cooperative behavior) are especially 
sensitive to the perceived forgiveness of the victim, while perceived forgiveness has less 
impact on decisions to apologize among high trusters, who generally already harbor 
impressions of benign intent of others. These findings therefore further suggest that 
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perpetrators' tendency to base decisions to apologize or not on instrumental motives may 
be rooted in the desire to prevent the social risks associated with apologizing.  
It is important to stress that the present findings were obtained by inducing actual 
transgressions and examining actual apology behavior. This approach – to our knowledge 
– is the first effort to examine actual apology behavior and transgressions in a controlled 
bargaining setting. Looking at the actual deliverance of apologies by a perpetrator is 
important because intentions to apologize may not necessarily correspond with actual 
apologetic behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). We thus urge future research on apologies 
to examine actual deliveries of apologies as a response to actual transgressions. Our study 
provides a useful tool to achieve this aim. 
Our paradigm succeeded in inducing transgressions with the majority of the 
participants. By inducing transgressions we needed to rely on deception. Although we are 
sensitive to the controversies regarding deception in experimental research (for a 
discussion on the topic, consult Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), we believe with this type of 
research it is inevitable to use deception. As participants are motivated to behave in 
socially appropriate ways, especially when they believe they are being watched, 
transgressing against another participant in a lab is something that rarely occurs naturally. 
To create a situation, equal to all participants, under which participants were most likely 
to transgress, we relied on deception. Because none of the participants expressed any 
objection to our experimental procedure during the debriefing, we believe our paradigm 
enables researchers to create real transgressions without being too psychological 
distressing. 
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It is important to note that our instrumental hypothesis regarding apologizing 
includes the notion of reciprocity. As we have mentioned earlier and as our results show, 
a perpetrator is more willing to apologize when it is likely that this gesture will be 
reciprocated with forgiveness. A stronger form of this instrumental hypothesis could, 
however, also be formulated. That is, if it is likely that you are going to be forgiven 
anyway, perpetrators could also think that there is no reason to apologize anymore. From 
an economic point of view (i.e. maximizing one’s own pay-off) it would indeed make 
little sense to admit culpability by apologizing if you have already acquired the insurance 
of your valued good, that is, forgiveness. This ‘strong’ instrumentality hypothesis can 
also be considered to be in line with research on moral credentials (Monin & Miller, 
2001). Research on moral credentials has shown that once people establish themselves as 
a moral person, they are more likely to behave in ways that could be interpreted as 
immoral. If the victim is likely to forgive the perpetrator, the perpetrator can interpret this 
as an affirmation of his/her morality (Schnabel & Nadler, 2008). Our results contradict 
this framework, as perpetrators decided to increase their display of moral behavior by 
apologizing, rather than feeling freed not to apologize (a prediction that would be in line 
with the moral credentials framework). In line with our findings, research by Wallace and 
colleagues (Wallace, Exline & Baumeister, 2008) also shows that expressions of 
forgiveness deter future offences against the victim. Future research should investigate 
the relationship between moral credentials and expressions of forgiveness in order to 
further our understanding of both the consequences of showing forgiveness and the 
regulation of moral behavior. 
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Future research might zoom in on this interesting question on when our 
instrumentality hypothesis would be valid and when the strong version of the 
instrumentality hypothesis would apply more. One possible way of testing this may be to 
include personality variables that could help us tease apart in what way these 
instrumentality perspectives influence people’s apologetic behavior. Social value 
orientation predicts whether people approach interpersonal situations as more 
instrumental versus more social. It could very well be that proselfs deem an apology 
unnecessary when they interact with a forgiving victim (i.e. they behave accordingly the 
strong instrumental perspective), while prosocials are more inclined to reciprocate.  
 Importantly, by focusing on the perspective of perpetrators, our findings also 
provide a much needed extension to the apology literature, calling previous findings into 
question. As noted, previous research on apologies has mainly focused on how victims 
respond to apologies and thus has largely overlooked the perspective of perpetrators. As a 
result, hardly any research exists examining whether perpetrators actually are willing to 
deliver apologies, and when they may be likely to do so. Our findings are among the first 
– at least to our knowledge – to reveal some insights into this question and thus 
demonstrate the need to also consider the perspective of the perpetrator to arrive at a 
better understanding of the reconciliation process through the use of apologies. 
The present findings contain a hopeful message. Our findings suggest that 
expressions of forgiveness have the potential to limit a possible downward spiral of 
unconstructive behaviors that can take place after a transgression. That is, when victims 
take the initiative to communicate forgiveness, perpetrators are likely to reciprocate by 
actually apologizing and taking responsibility for their misdeeds. Thus, an initial positive 
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signal by the victim may elicit the kind of behavior by the perpetrator that is needed to 
start the reconciliation process. However, there is also a downside to this effect: 
perpetrators may actually be less willing to apologize when it seems unlikely that 
apologies will be reciprocated with forgiveness. In other words, if no positive feedback 
with respect to forgiveness is communicated by the victim, apologies will most likely not 
be given. This finding challenges the true value of apologies as a trust repair tool. Take, 
for example, the situation of serious transgressions where victims are likely to be angry, 
and not very motivated to forgive. Under such circumstances, victims have the strongest 
need and request for apologies (Exline et al., 2007). However, given the negative 
reactions on behalf of the victim, our results suggest that perpetrators will be unwilling to 
apologize. 
 In conclusion, our findings show that apology behavior by perpetrators is driven 
by the forgiveness tendencies of victims, thus pointing out the somewhat paradoxical 
message that the desired response of an apology by the victim actually depends on the 
positive reaction (i.e. showing forgiveness) of that same victim towards the perpetrator. 
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Footnotes 
 1The mean level of dispositional trust did not differ significantly between the 
participants that committed a transgression (M = 3.92, SD = .93), and the 
participants that did not commit a transgression (M = 4.02, SD = .85, t(151) -.62, p 
= .54). 
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Table 1 
Odds and and odds ratio’s of an apology per condition 
 Trust Odds ratio for 
trust within each 
forgiveness 
condition 
Forgiveness manipulation Low trust (-1 SD High trust (+1 SD)  
Forgiving Odds: 25.918** 
(Prob: 96%) 
Odds: 3.797** 
(Prob: 79%) 
6.826* 
Not Forgiving Odds: .982 
(Prob: 50%) 
Odds: 1.566 
(Prob: 61%) 
0.627 
Odds ratios for 
forgiveness within low 
and high trust 
26.393** 2.425  
Note. Proportions that an apology will be given. * = p < .05, ** = p <.01. 
 
